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Introduction
This paper presents some results in monetary theory
derived using very simple game-theoretic models of
the exchange process. The underlying model is a vari-
ant of search theory, a framework that has been used
extensively in a wide variety of applications. This
approach is well suited to discussing the process of
exchange and money’s role in the process. The ap-
proach utilized here is explicitly strategic, in the fol-
lowing natural sense: When I decide whether to ac-
cept in trade a certain object other than one I desire for
my own consumption—for example, money—I must
conjecture as to the probability that other agents will
accept it from me in the future. This evidently ought
to be modeled as a game.
In search theory, the type of game to be consid-
ered is explicitly dynamic, and exchange takes place
in real time. Also, the models allow us to focus pre-
cisely on various frictions in the exchange process that
might give money a role in an equilibrium, or efﬁ-
cient, arrangement. Among the frictions are these:
Agents are not always in the same place at the same
time; long-run commitments cannot be enforced; and
agents are anonymous in the sense that their histories
are not public information. Such frictions are crucial
for a logically coherent theory of money; the approach
described here helps to clarify each one’s role.
This approach contrasts with attempts to model the
roleofmoneyinacompetitiveequilibrium (Walrasian)
model—a difﬁcult task that has met with mixed suc-
cess at best. In a competitive equilibrium model, the
exchange process is not explicitly modeled. That is,
agents start with an initial allocation A and choose a
ﬁnal allocation B so as to maximize utility, subject to
the latter not costing more than the former, but how
they get from point A to point B is not discussed.
Does some unmodeled agent (maybe the auctioneer)
make the necessary trades with a “pick-up and deliv-
ery service”? Or do the agents trade directly with each
other? Do they trade bilaterally or multilaterally? In
real time, or before production and consumption activ-
ity starts? Do they barter directly or trade indirectly
using media of exchange? The standard competitive
equilibrium paradigm does not address such questions.
Search models, in contrast, are designed with exactly
these issues in mind and therefore are logical tools for
studying monetary economics, as we shall illustrate.
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I. The Basic Model
To model anonymous trade, it is natural to start with a




continuum. For simplicity, we assume these agents




￿ continuum of indivisible consumption goods.
To generate gains from trade, we need to assume that
agentsare specialized. There are manyways to do this,
but an easy one is to assume that each agent i is able
to produce just one type of good. The unit production
cost for any agent is c
￿ 0. For convenience, we as-
sume that these goods cannot be stored and so must be
consumed immediately after they are produced. Obvi-
ously, this means that consumption goods cannot serve
as media of exchange, allowing us to highlight the role
of money.
To make trade interesting in the model, we need to
assume that tastes are heterogeneous. Again, there are
many ways to do this, but for simplicity we assume
the following: First, given any two agents i and j,
write iWj to mean “i wants to consume the good that
j produces”—in the sense that i derives utility u
￿ c
from consuming what j produces if iWj, and he derives
utility 0 from consuming what j produces otherwise.












y. The ﬁrst assumption, prob
￿ iWi
￿
￿ 0, means that no
agent ever wants to consume his own output (which is
why they trade). The second assumption parameter-
izes the extent of the basic search friction: The smaller
x is, the lower the probability that a random trader has
what you want. However, the third assumption is the
important one, since it parameterizes Jevons’ (1875)
famous double coincidence of wants problem: The
smaller y is, the lower the probability that a trader who
has what you want also wants what you have.1
Besides the consumption goods already mentioned,
there is another object called money, which consists of





units of a storable object (of course, money must be
storable to be useful). Holding money yields utility g:
If g
￿ 0, money pays a dividend, like many real assets,
and if g
￿ 0, then money has a storage cost; g
￿ 0 de-
scribes the case of pure ﬁat money. Although this last
case may be the most interesting, for generality we al-
low g
￿
￿ 0. Initially, one unit of money is randomly
allocated to each of M agents. Although we will re-
lax this later, for now we assume that agents holding
money cannot produce (one way to motivate this is to
assume that after producing, you need to consume be-
fore you can produce again). Thus, no one can ever
acquire more than one unit of money, and so an agent
always holds either 0 or 1 unit of money. To simplify
the presentation, we do not allow agents to freely dis-
pose of money, but this is never binding except in one
case mentioned below.
We now describe the trading process. Rather than
assuming a centralized (Walrasian) market, here the
agents must trade bilaterally. The simplest way to
model this is to assume that they meet according to
a pairwise random matching process. Upon meeting, a
pairdecidewhethertotrade, thenpartcompanyandre-
enter the matching process. Let a denote the (Poisson)
arrival rate in the matching process—that is, the prob-
ability of meeting someone in a given unit of time.2
For reasons discussed later, we assume the history of
any agent’s past meetings and trades is not known to
anyone else.
Wewanttoanalyzeagents’individualtradingstrate-
gies. An agent obviously should never accept a good
in trade if he does not want to consume it, since goods
are not storable. Whenever possible, agents should
barter for a good they do want to consume (the case of
a double coincidence). What needs to be determined
is whether an agent should trade goods for money and
moneyforgoods. Letp0 denotetheprobabilitythatthe
representative agent trades goods for money, and let p1
denote the probability that he trades money for goods.
These must satisfy the equilibrium conditions given
below. We will say that money is used as a medium of
exchange, or circulates, if and only if p
￿ p0p1
￿ 0.
Let V0 and V1 be the value functions (lifetime, dis-
counted, expected utility) of agents with 0 or 1 units
of money. Since we consider only stationary and sym-
metric equilibria,Vj does not depend on time or on the
agent’s name, only his money inventories.
If we think of time as proceeding in discrete peri-
ods of length t, we can calculate the payoff of holding
money as follows: The probability of meeting anyone
during this period is approximately at by the Pois-
￿
1 Several notions of specialization in the literature are
special cases of this model. For example, in Kiyotaki and
Wright (1991) or Aiyagari and Wallace (1991), there are N
goods and N types of agents, where type n produces good
n and wants good n
￿ 1
￿ mod N
￿ . Then x
￿ 1
￿ N, and y
￿ 1 if
N
￿ 2, while y
￿ 0 if N
￿ 2. Alternatively, in Kiyotaki and Wright






￿ are independent, and so y
￿ x.
￿
2 It is the bilateral rather than the random matching as-
sumption that is important. Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright
(2000) show how to redo the model, allowing agents to choose
endogenously whom they meet, rather than meeting at ran-
dom. Their model shares the basic insights discussed here,
although it is complicated by the need to determine equilib-
rium meeting patterns as well as equilibrium trades.
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son assumption.3 If the person you meet can produce
(meaning, in the version of the model that we are con-
sidering here, he does not have money), which occurs
with probability 1
￿ M, and you want what he can pro-
duce, which occurs with probability x, and you both
want to trade, which occurs with probability p in equi-
librium, then you trade, consume, and continue with-
out money, for a total payoff of u
￿ V0. In all other
events (you meet no one, you meet someone with a
good you do not want, etc.), you simply continue with
your money, for a payoff of V1. In all events, you also





























￿ is the approximation error associated with





















Dividing by t and taking the limit as t
￿ 0, we ar-












An analogous argument implies that the value function















The ﬁrst term in this expression represents the gain
from a direct barter trade, while the second represents
the gain from trading goods for money with probabil-
ity p. Notice that you can only barter when there is a
double coincidence of wants and the other person has
no money.
II. Equilibrium




￿ c, and the net gain from trading money
for goods by D1
￿ u
￿ V0
￿ V1. If we normalize ax
￿ 1
to reduce notation (which we can always do with no






















































Notice that Dj depends on p, so to see if some candi-
date p0 and p1 constitute an equilibrium, one simply
inserts the pj and checks equation (5).
Consider ﬁrst the case g
￿ 0 (ﬁat money). This im-
plies D1
￿ 0 for all parameter values, so we always
have p1
￿ 1. Also, D0 is equal in sign to p0



















￿ 0 is always an equilibrium: Since ˆ p
￿
0, p0
￿ 0 implies p0
￿ ˆ p, which implies D0
￿ 0. Thus,
p0
￿ 0 satisﬁes the equilibrium condition. Naturally,




















￿ 1, which means p0
￿ 1 is an equilibrium as
well. So there is also an equilibrium where ﬁat money
circulates as long as c is not too big.4 Finally, if ˆ p
￿ 1,
there is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which
p0
￿ ˆ p. In this case, if other agents accept money with
exactly the right probability ˆ p, you are indifferent as
to accepting or rejecting it, so randomizing is an equi-
librium.
The above model is essentially that of Kiyotaki and
Wright (1993), except that they assume c
￿ 0 in addi-
tion to g
￿ 0. This implies that three equilibria neces-
sarily exist, p
￿ 0, p
￿ 1, and p
￿ y. In the mixed-
strategy equilibrium, money is accepted with the same
probability as a good (since y is the probability of
a double coincidence), which makes you indifferent.
When c
￿ 0, money must have a strictly greater prob-
ability of being accepted than a barter trade for you
to be indifferent about accepting money, because you
must incur the production cost to get the money. More
generally, when g
￿
￿ 0, we have to determine p1 en-
dogenously; for example, if g is large, then agents may
prefer to hoard rather than spend their money.
The results for the general case are summarized as
follows:
￿
3 That is, the probability of meeting one person in a pe-
riod of length t is at
￿ o
￿ t
￿ , and the probability of meeting
more than one is o
￿ t










4 Alternatively, for a given c
￿ 0, we can say that r and
M must be relatively small for a monetary equilibrium to exist
(agents must be patient and money not too plentiful).
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Proposition 1. There are ﬁve types of equilibria, and
they exist in the following regions of parameter space:
1. p0
￿ 1 and p1
￿ 0 is an equilibrium iff r
￿ r2
2. p0
￿ 0 and p1
￿ 1 is an equilibrium iff r
￿ r3
3. p0


















￿ 1 and p1
￿ 1 is an equilibrium iff r1
￿ r
￿ r4




















































These are the only (steady-state) equilibria.
Proof: See the appendix.
We characterized the regions where the different
equilibria exist in terms of r, but we could have used




￿ r4. Also, note that our assumption
of no free disposal is never binding, except possibly
when p0
￿ 0, and even then only if g
￿ 0.5 More im-
portantly, there are equilibria where p
￿ 0 and g
￿ 0;
that is, agents value money and use it as a medium of
exchange despite its storage cost. We will have more
to say about the economics underlying the above re-
sults in the next section, after we introduce a slight
variation on the model, since it will be interesting to
compare the two versions.
III. Alternative Specication
A key assumption in the above model is that agents
holding money cannot produce; this is what prevents
them from acquiring more than a single unit of money.
The fact that agents hold either 0 or 1 unit of money
is what makes the model so tractable (see below). Al-
though the assumption that agents holding money can-
not produce is common in the literature, it has some
undesirable implications. For example, if two agents
with money meet and there is a double coincidence of
wants, they cannot trade. A related implication is that
asM increases,theproductivecapacityoftheeconomy
necessarily decreases, which makes it difﬁcult to inter-
pret the effects of changes in the money. So here we
present an alternative model, ﬁrst discussedby Siandra
(1993, 1996), where agents with money can produce,
and we simply impose the condition that agents can
store, at most, one unit of money.
The ﬁrst issue to be resolved is, what happens in
a double coincidence when you have money and the
other person does not—do you barter or pay with
cash?6 We resolve this by allowing agents to play the
following simple game: First, with probability b the
agent with money is chosen and with probability 1
￿ b
the agent without money is chosen to propose either
a barter or a cash transaction (in principle they could
also propose not to trade at all, but we ignore this op-
tion, which will always be dominated by proposing
barter). Second, the other agent responds either by
accepting, which executes the proposal, or rejecting,
which implies they part company (ﬁgure 1). A strat-
egy for the agent with j units of money, j
￿ 1 or 0,
is denoted as yj, which equals the probability that he
proposes barter (and so 1
￿ yj is the probability he
proposes cash).
Proposition 2. In a double-coincidence meeting be-
tween an agent with and an agent without money,
generically the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies is y0
￿ y1
￿ 1.
Proof: See the appendix.
Havingresolvedtheambiguitythatariseswhenboth
barter and cash are available, we can now derive the
Bellman equations. Again, let time proceed in discrete
￿
5 To be precise, we should say what agents do after dis-
posing of their money. We assume here that they cannot
trade, as they cannot produce. Hence, agents will dispose of
money and drop out of the trading process iff V1
￿ 0. Since it
is easy to see that V0
￿




￿ 0, the only case where disposal could po-
tentially occur is p0
￿ 0, which impliesV1
￿ g
￿ r. Hence, agents
dispose of money if and only if p0
￿ 0 and g
￿ 0.
￿
6 This is the only ambiguous case; every other meeting
has only one feasible transaction (that is, if you encounter a
double coincidence and have no money, barter is the only op-
tion). The issue did not come up in the previous section, be-
cause agents with money cannot barter.
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parison to equations (1) and (2) in the previous model.
Observe, for example, that now a money holder barters
every time he encounters a double coincidence, which
occurs with probability atxy. Indeed, he uses money





does not have money and they both agree to trade,




Rearranging, we let t
￿ 0 and normalize ax
￿ 1
as before, to write the continuous-time Bellman equa-

































Although the value functions are different across the
two models, wecompute Dj anddeﬁne equilibrium ex-
actly as in the last section. The results are as follows.
Proposition 3. In the alternative model, where agents
with money can produce, there are ﬁve potential types
of equilibria and they exist in the following regions of
parameter space:
1. p0
￿ 1 and p1
￿ 0 is an equilibrium iff r
￿ ˆ r2
2. p0
￿ 0 and p1
￿ 1 is an equilibrium iff r
￿ ˆ r3
3. p0
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These are the only (steady-state) equilibria.
Proof: The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 1





















































￿ space where the different equi-
libria exist in the two models (those where money
holders cannot produce and those where they can pro-
duce)areshowninﬁgures2and3. Thesameﬁvetypes
of equilibria exist in both models; the regions where
they exist are similar but quantitatively different—
unless y
￿ 0, of course, since the models are identical
when there is no barter. In either case, when g is very
low the only equilibrium is one in which no one ac-
cepts money; if g is very high, the only equilibrium is
one in which no one spends it. Hence, money circu-
lates if and only if its intrinsic properties are not too





￿ -Space When Money Holders
Can Produce











































where the unique equilibrium is p
￿ 1, as well as other
regions where there are multiple equilibria: In one re-
gion, we must have p1
￿ 1, but p0 can be 0, 1, or be-
tween 0 and 1; in another region, we must have p0
￿ 1,
while p1 can be 0, 1, or between 0 and 1.7
The models differ in that it is actually more difﬁcult
to get money to circulate when money holders can pro-
duce; the potential region where p
￿ 0 is larger when
they cannot. Intuitively, agents with money are more
willing to spend it when they cannot produce, since
doing so allows them to barter. If g
￿ c
￿ 0, the dif-
ferences between the two models are especially stark:






￿ , and p
￿ 1; in the
other model there are two, p
￿ 0 and p
￿ 1. The intu-
ition is as follows: When money holders can produce,
there is no cost associated with acquiring money when
we set g
￿ c
￿ 0, so if there is a strictly positive prob-
ability of money being accepted, you should always
accept it. This is not true when money holders can-
￿
7 It is well known that there is a strategic complementarity
in the decision to accept money, p0, but it is less well under-
stood that the same is true of p1. For some parameters, an
agent is more willing to spend money if he believes that oth-
ers will do the same. This only occurs when g
￿ 0.
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not produce, because even when g
￿ c
￿ 0, accepting
money involves the opportunity cost of giving up your
barter option.
The version of the model in which agents with
money cannot produce is easy to motivate by saying
that one must consume before producing, since this
leads naturally to the result that agents in equilibrium
always hold either 0 or 1 unit of money. However,
the alternative version where money holders can pro-
duce also seems more natural in some respects. For
example, when two agents with money meet and there
is a double coincidence, they trade. Of course, this
version does require assuming directly that agents can
only store 0 or 1 units of money. There is not neces-
sarily a right or wrong model, and the choice should
be dictated by how well it addresses a certain question
and how tractable it is in any given application.
IV. Welfare






￿ V0 (average utility). For the purpose of
discussion, we also set g
￿ 0. Using straightforward































where the superscript K indicates the case where
money holders cannot produce and the superscript S
indicates the case where they can. Notice ﬁrst that
when we compare two equilibria in either model, other
thingsbeingequal,W isgreaterintheequilibrium with
the higher p. This simply says that the more accept-
able money is, the more useful it is. The next thing to
notice is that across the two models, given any p we
have WS
￿ WK with strict inequality as long as y
￿ 0
and M
￿ 0; not surprisingly, agents are better off if we
allow money holders to produce.
We now want to focus on equilibrium with p
￿ 1
and consider maximizingW with respect to M. The re-




2. The intuition is simple. Money is useful
because it facilitates trade every time an agent i with
money and an agent j without money meet and iWj
holds. To maximize the frequency of such meetings,
we should have half the agents holding money and half
of them not: M
￿
1
2. For the other model, the welfare-











2. Hence, the optimal M is lower in this model,
simply because when money holders cannot produce,
increasing M “crowds out” barter. Still, for small y the




Welfare as a Function of M
rW
















This discussion ignores the fact that p
￿ 1 is not an
equilibrium for all parameter values. If g
￿ 0, it is easy
to see that in either version of the model, p
￿ 1 is an












true optimal policy, then, is the minimum of M and the
values given above. In ﬁgure 4, we depict welfare in




where money is accepted with probability 0, p, or 1.
The superscript j
￿ K or S refers to the two different
models. The curves are drawn only for values of M
such that the equilibria exist. Figure 5 shows welfare
as a function of y, given that we set M to its welfare-
maximizing level (which depends on y). These ﬁgures
illustrate various properties, including: W is always
higher when money holders can produce; and W in-
creases with p across equilibria in either model.
V. Essentiality of Money
At this stage, it is instructive to highlight the role
of various frictions in the model, to understand what
makes money essential. Following Hahn (1965), we
say money is essential if it allows agents to achieve al-
locations they cannot achieve with other mechanisms
that also respect the enforcement and information con-
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FIGURE 5










straints in the environment.8
First, we need some sort of double coincidence of
wants problem. For this it is important that not ev-
erybody can trade multilaterally. For example, con-












￿ . If all agents meet at the same place
and are able to make multilateral trades, it is feasible
for each agent to produce and consume in the period:
Agent 2 produces for agent 1, agent 1 produces for
agent 3, and agent 3 produces for agent 2. Our restric-
tion to bilateral meetings, given specialized tastes and
technology, is merely a convenient way to generate a
double-coincidence problem. In the three-agent exam-
ple, in every bilateral meeting one agent wants what
the other produces, while the other does not.
Second, even given a double-coincidence problem,
for money to be essential it is also important that
agents cannot commit to long-term agreements. Con-
sider the following credit arrangement: “produce for
anyone you meet who wants your good.” This ar-
rangement resembles credit in the sense that agents re-
ceive consumption today in exchange for nothing but
a “promise” to repay someone in kind at a future date.
It is also obviously an efﬁcient arrangement; that is, it






￿ r, given the normalization ax
￿ 1, where
the subscript c on Wc stands for credit. If agents could
commit to this arrangement ex ante, they would all
agree to do so, and there would be no need for money.
Clearly, an imperfect ability to commit to future ac-
tions is important if money is to have an essential role.
However, even in the absence of explicit commit-
ments, cooperative agreements like the credit arrange-
ment can sometimes be enforced by reputational con-
siderations if individual actions are public informa-
tion. Thus, consider the arrangement: “produce for
anyone who wants your production good as long as
everyone else has done so in the past; as soon as some-
one deviates from this, trigger to plan X,” where plan
X is to be determined. Of course, plan X must be
self-enforcing (that is, it must be an equilibrium), and
we want the outcome of plan X to be sufﬁciently un-
pleasant to keep agents from deviating from the ef-
ﬁcient arrangement. We will assume here that plan
X is to trade if and only if there is a double coinci-






￿ r, where the subscript b stands for barter.9
It is in individuals’ self-interest not to deviate from
the credit arrangement in which they are supposed to
produce if and only if
￿ c
￿ Wc










￿ c. As always, if
agents are sufﬁciently patient, the threat of trigger-
ing to pure barter supports the efﬁcient outcome, and
again money is not essential. Of course, this assumes
that agents’ trading histories can be observed publicly;
otherwise, it is not possible for agents to use trigger
strategies.10 When trading histories are private infor-
mation, the only sustainable outcome without money
is pure barter. But if there is money, we can do better
than pure barter, even when trading histories are pri-
￿
8 For a recent treatment of this problem, see Kocher-
lakota (1998).
￿
9 We do not trigger to autarky because we assume that
if two agents want to barter without it being observed, they
can; so the worst possible equilibrium is the one where none
but double-coincidence trades occur. Nothing much hinges
on this; a similar message holds if we can trigger to autarky,
and it is, in fact, easier to support credit-like arrangements by
triggering to autarky.
￿
10 If the number of agents was small, then even if agents
did not observe all other agents’ histories but only their own,
we could potentially support the efﬁcient arrangement by the
following strategy: “If ever you directly observe someone de-
viate (by not producing for you when you would like him to),
stop producing for anyone else.” This would set off a chain of
agents who observe deviations and would eventually lead the
economy into autarky. With a large number of agents, how-
ever, if I fail to produce for you, there is zero probability that
in the future I will meet you or I will meet someone who has
met you, and so the chain will never get back to me. So with
a large number of agents, to support credit it does not sufﬁce
to have agents observe (only) their own histories. See Araujo
(2000) for more discussion.
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vate. Notice that monetary exchange generates lower
welfare than the credit arrangement, although higher
than pure barter.
Money does not do as well as credit because of the
random-meeting technology and because money hold-
ings are bounded, leading to some meetings where I
want your good and you do not want mine, but either I
have no money or you already have money. In these
meetings, monetary exchange will not work, while
credit could work as long as trading histories are pub-
licly observable. Even if we relax the upper bound
on money holdings, the fact that money holdings are
bounded belowby zero meansthat money cannotdo as
well as credit in a random-matching environment. We
conclude that money has an essential role in the model
for three reasons: the double-coincidence problem, the
lack of commitment, and private information on trad-
ing histories. For an extended discussion of these is-
sues, see Kocherlakota (1998, 2000) and Kocherlakota
and Wallace (1998).
VI. Prices
This section provides an extension in which the as-
sumption of indivisible goods is relaxed, although
money is still indivisible and so agents will always
have either 0 or 1 units of money. Following Shi
(1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995), we will use bar-
gaining theory to determine prices endogenously. For
simplicity, we set y
￿ 0, so there is no direct barter.11
Given that goods are perfectly divisible, let u
￿ q
￿ be
the utility of consuming q units of one’s consump-
tion good and c
￿ q
￿ the disutility of producing q units

































￿ 0, for q
￿ 0, with at least one of the weak











￿ . Also, there is a ˆ q






￿ . When a buyer meets a seller who can
produce the right good, they bargain over how much q
will be exchanged for the buyer’s unit of money, im-
plying a nominal price p
￿ 1
￿ q. Otherwise, the model
is exactly identical to that in the previous section.
LettingV1 andV0 denotethevaluefunctionsandtak-
ing q
￿ Q as given, the generalizations of the dynamic

































￿ as given, q will solve
a bargaining problem. In equilibrium, of course, q
￿
Q. The bargaining model can be formulated in several
























where q is the bargaining power of the buyer and Tj






































￿ into itself. That is,
if other agents are giving Q units of output for one
￿
11 This assumption makes it irrelevant whether we use
the version in which money holders can produce or the one
in which they cannot, since they are identical when y
￿ 0.
Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) analyze the case
with y
￿ 0, but only for a special bargaining solution and only
for the model where money holders cannot produce. Ru-
pert, Schindler, and Wright (forthcoming) consider the general
case.
￿
12 It is also common to set the threat points equal to con-
tinuation values: Tj
￿ Vj. Both can be derived from an under-
lying strategic model; see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for
the bargaining theory.
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unit of money, then a particular pair bargaining bi-
laterally will agree to q
￿ q
￿ Q




￿ . In general, we must be care-
ful with the constraints on the bargaining problem:
When y
￿ 0, the constraints are never binding in equi-
librium. However, if y
￿ 0 the constraints may bind;
therefore, it is instructive to proceed allowing for the




















￿ . The former constraint is satis-
ﬁed if and only if q
￿ f
￿ Q
￿ , and the latter is satisﬁed if
and only if q
￿ g
￿ Q
￿ , for increasing functions f and g.




￿ plane, and g lies below f and below the
45
￿




￿ . Also, f crosses the 45
￿
line




￿ . Hence, our search for equilibria




The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior solution to































This deﬁnes a function q
￿ e
￿ Q
￿ , also shown in the
ﬁgure. It too goes through the origin and intersects the
45
￿







































￿ q1, it does not really matter how we deﬁne q
￿ Q
￿ ,
which necessarily is below the 45
￿








￿ has exactly two ﬁxed points:
a nonmonetary equilibrium q




One important property of monetary equilibrium
(that continues to hold even if y
￿ 0) is the following.
Recall that q









￿ . Then it is





￿ and, therefore, qe
￿ q
￿ ,
as seen in ﬁgure 6. This is signiﬁcant because q
￿ is the


























￿ says that in equilibrium qe is too low—
or, equivalently, the price level is too high.14
The economic intuition for this result is straight-
forward. If a seller could turn the proceeds from his
production into immediate consumption, as in a static








￿ . But in a monetary exchange, the pro-
ceeds from production consist of cash that can only be
spent in the future when an opportunity to buy comes
along. Since he discounts the future, a seller is only








￿ . Indeed, to verify that frictions are driv-
ing the result, observe that when r





Another question to ask is how q depends on M.
One might expect ¶qe
￿ ¶M
￿ 0, but it is actually pos-
sible to have ¶qe
￿ ¶M
￿ 0 for small M (at least if r is
also small). The explanation is that when M is close to
zero, very little trade occurs. In this case, increasing
M increases the frequency of productive meetings be-
tween buyers and sellers, which in turn increases both
V1 and V0. The net effect on the bargaining solution
can be a higher q. However, there is some threshold
ˆ M
￿ 1
2 such that ¶qe
￿ ¶M
￿ 0 for all M
￿ ˆ M, so we
can be sure that the value of money eventually begins
to fall as M increases.
We can also ask how M affects welfare. It is clear
that if a planner can choose both M and q to maximize









2 maximizes the number of trades (just as in the
previous section when y
￿ 0), and q
￿ q
￿ maximizes
the surplus that results from each trade. However, if
the planner can choose only M and q is determined
in equilibrium, then the value of M that maximizes W








































2. This illustrates the trade-off between provid-
ing liquidity (making trade easier), and reducing the
value of money (lowering the surplus from each trade).
Reducing the value of money reduces welfare because,




￿ 0, one can show that for large r there are no mon-
etary equilibria, while for small r there are multiple monetary
equilibria.
￿
14 This is true even though bargaining is bilaterally efﬁcient
in the sense that the agreement is on the Pareto frontier in
each exchange, taking as given the value of Q that prevails in
other exchanges. The point is that all agents would be better
off (in an ex ante sense) if they could get everyone to commit
to increasing q. A stronger result is actually true: Not only is qe
too low according to the ex ante criterion W, it is also too low
according to the ex post criteria V0 and V1. That is, buyers and




also can be shown for models where agents can
hold any amount of money; see Trejos and Wright (1995, pp.
133–4).
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VII. Dynamics
We previously focused on steady states; in this section,




the bargaining solution (equation [13]). This is equiv-
alent to assuming that agents with money get to make








since this is the most a producer would give to acquire
currency. In the previous section’s model, this imme-
diately implies V0






















An equilibrium is a q that solves equation (16). Al-
though the model with take-it-or-leave-it offers is in-
teresting in its own right, mainly because of its sim-
plicity, we use it here to study dynamics.
We need to rederive the Bellman equations without
limiting our attention to steady state. First, write the



































where we have reintroduced the utility of holding
































Taking the limit as t










































Note that because of equation (15), the ﬁrst term on
the right side of equation (18) is 0.
Henceforth, we will omit the time argument t when
there is no risk of confusion. Then an equilibrium is a





satisfying (17), (18), and (15) at every point in time.
As in steady-state analysis, we want to eliminate the
value functions from (15). To this end, subtract (17)


























￿ ˙ V0. Inserting this

























Any bounded, non-negative path for q solving the







q F q = ( )

g
To keep the number of cases manageable, assume
g
￿ 0. Figure 7 shows equation (19) for this case.
When g
￿ 0 and large, there are no monetary equilib-
ria; when g
￿ 0 but not too big, there are two monetary
steady states, qL and qH. Clearly, qL is stable while qH
is unstable. Hence, in addition to the steady states,





there is an equilibrium that converges monotonically




￿ , there is an equilibrium
that converges monotonically down to qL. The former
￿
15 See Coles and Wright (1998) and Ennis (1999).
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(latter) equilibria are characterized by deﬂation (inﬂa-
tion), due simply to beliefs. If agents expect prices to
change, this can be a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. When
g
￿ 0, qL coalesces with the nonmonetary equilibrium
q
￿ 0. Hence, in addition to the steady states, the set





and converging down to q
￿ 0.
VIII. Extensions and Related Literature
In this section, we provide a short overview of some
extensions to and applications of the above models
in the literature. We will discuss some of the papers
brieﬂy; others we will merely mention. Our intent is
to provide a bibliography rather than a review, so that
the interested reader at least knows where to look.16
The basic search-theoretic monetary model can be
generalized along several dimensions. Specialization
is endogenized in more detail in Kiyotaki and Wright
(1993), Burdett, Coles, Kiyotaki, and Wright (1995),
Shi (1997b), and Reed (1999), for example. More
general production structures are incorporated in Kiy-
otaki and Wright (1991) and Johri (1999). Long-term
partnerships, in addition to one-time exchanges, are
considered in Siandra (1996) and Corbae and Ritter
(1997). Various extensions of bargaining are consid-
ered by Engineer and Shi (1998, 1999), Berentsen,
Molico, and Wright (forthcoming), and Jafarey and
Masters (1999). We already mentioned credit in sec-
tion II, and there are several papers that attempt to
have money and credit in the model at the same time:
Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) assume histories are
imperfectly observed over time; Cavalcanti and Wal-
lace(1999a,b) and Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides
(1999) assume that the histories of only some agents
are observed; and Jin and Temzelides (1999) assume
only histories of local neighbors are observed. Follow-
ing Diamond (1990), some papers have bilateral credit
and money, with repayment (explicitly or implicitly)
enforced by collateral. These include Hendry (1992),
Shi (1996), Schindler (1998), and Yiting Li (forthcom-
ing).
Many papers deal with commodity money, as op-
posed to ﬁat money. The basic idea is to determine
endogenously which of many possible goods become
media of exchange. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) con-
sider a version of the model where type i consumes
good i and produces i
￿ 1, with N
￿ 3 types. The
goods are all storable, although at different costs. It
is shown that goods with low storage costs may or
may not come to serve as money, depending on pa-
rameter values as well as which equilibrium the econ-
omy is in; that is, there can be equilibria in which
high-storage-cost goods are used as money. Aiyagari
and Wallace (1991, 1992) generalize this to N types
and consider several applications. Wright (1995) ex-
tends the model to allow agents to choose their type.
Renero (1994, 1998b, 1999) considers several exten-
sions of the framework. Among other things, he shows
that equilibria in which goods with high storage costs
serve as money can have good welfare properties, per-
haps surprisingly (the intuition is that there is more
trade in such equilibria). Other related papers include
Kehoe, Kiyotaki, and Wright (1993), Cuadras-Morato
and Wright (1997), and Renero (1998a).
There is also a literature on search models with pri-
vate information. Williamson and Wright (1994) as-
sume there is uncertainty concerning the quality of
goods. In such an environment, a generally recog-
nizable money has the potential role of mitigating the
informational frictions and inducing agents to adopt
strategies that increase the probability of acquiring
high-quality output. So money may be valued even if
the double-coincidence problem vanishes (that is, even
if y
￿ 1).
Trejos (1997) presents a simpliﬁed version of the
model (essentially by setting y
￿ 0), which allows him
to obtain analyticalsolutions tothe model. Kim (1996)
endogenizestheextentof theprivate information prob-
lem. Cuadras-Morato (1994) and Yiting Li (1995b)
useaversionof thismodelto studycommodity money.
All the above papers assume indivisible goods. Tre-
jos (1999) combines private information with divisi-
ble goods and bargaining. Velde, Weber, and Wright
(1999) and Burdett, Trejos, and Wright (forthcoming)
use commodity money models with private informa-
tion to study some issues in monetary history, includ-
ing Gresham’s Law. Other related papers include Wal-
lace (1997b), Williamson (1998) and Katzman, Ken-
nan, and Wallace (1999).
Several papers attempt to model policy as follows:
There is a subset of agents who are subject to the
same search and information frictions as everyone else
￿
16 A large body of work in search theory is tangentially re-
lated to the approach to monetary economics presented here.
This brief review cannot discuss all such work, but we do want
to mention Diamond (1982); although there is no money in that
model, it is in some respects quite similar to that in section II.
The version in Diamond (1984) does have money, but it is im-
posed through a cash-in-advance constraint; so although it in
some ways resembles the framework presented here, its spirit
is quite different. See also Diamond and Yellin (1985). We
also mention Jones (1976) as well as the extensions by Oh
(1989) and Iwai (1996), which attempt to build a model along
lines similar to those presented here; see Ostroy and Starr
(1990) for a review of this and related work. Other general
discussions that concentrate more on models like the ones in
this paper include Wallace (1996, 1997a).
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but act collectively. Call these agents government
agents. The idea is to see how government agents’
exogenously speciﬁed trading rules affect the endoge-
nously determined equilibrium behavior of other (pri-
vate) agents. Papers in this group include Victor Li
(1994, 1995a), Ritter (1995), Aiyagari, Wallace, and
Wright (1996), Aiyagari and Wallace (1997), Li and
Wright (1998), Green and Weber (1996), Wallace and
Zhou (1997), and Berentsen (2000). For example, in
Victor Li (1994, 1995a, 1997), government agents can
tax money holdings when they meet private agents. A
key result is that taxing money holdings may be ef-
ﬁcient. The reason is that in his model (which also
endogenizes search intensity) there is too little search
by agents holding money, for standard reasons. Taxing
themincreasestheirsearcheffort, andthis canimprove
welfare.
The matching model seems a natural one for study-
ingissuesrelatedtointernationalmonetaryeconomics.
For example, one can think about parameterizing dif-
ferences in the efﬁciency of economic activity as well
as degrees of openness across countries in terms of ar-
rival rates. Among the ﬁrst authors to analyze this in a
model with multiple currencies and multiple countries
are Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993). They
ﬁnd that several types of equilibria can arise, includ-
ing those in which one currency circulates only lo-
cally while another emerges as an international cur-
rency; they ﬁnd other equilibria in which all currencies
are universally accepted. They compare these equi-
libria in terms of welfare. Zhou (1997) extends their
model to study currency exchange. These models as-
sume indivisible goods. Trejos and Wright (1999) en-
dogenize prices using divisible goods and bargaining.
Other examples of models with multiple currencies in-
clude Kultti (1996), Green and Weber (1996), Craig
and Waller (1999), Peterson (2000), and Curtis and
Waller (2000).
Some papers consider intermediation (in the form of
middlemen, for example) as an alternative (or some-
times in addition) to money. An early paper to explic-
itly consider intermediation in a search model with-
out money is Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987). They
generate a role for middlemen by specifying exoge-
nously a set of agents who may have a more efﬁ-
cient technology for ﬁnding buyers than sellers have
for ﬁnding buyers. Yiting Li (1998) is a very different
model, in which private information about the qual-
ity of consumption goods combined with the existence
of a costly quality veriﬁcation technology give rise to
a role for intermediation. In Shevchenko (2000), in-
termediation arises from inventory-theoretic consider-
ations: Middlemen keep a stock of several goods on
hand to increase the probability that a random buyer
will ﬁnd something he likes. The Shevchenko and Li
papers also endogenize the number of intermediaries
in the economy by means of a free entry condition.
See also Camera (2000), Camera and Winkler (2000),
and Hellwig (2000).
The framework’s most important recent extension
is perhaps the relaxation of the strong assumptions on
how much money agents can hold—typically, zero or
one unit of money, as we assume above. Models that
consider such an extension can be an order of magni-
tude more complicated, but they are obviously more
realistic and generate many interesting new results.
They are also capable of addressing more traditional
policy questions, such as the optimal rate of inﬂation,
which are difﬁcult to study in models where agents
hold only zero or one unit of money. Such a model
is contained in Molico (1999), who allows agents to
hold any nonnegative amount of money and to bargain
over the quantity of goods as well as the amount of
money that is traded in each bilateral meeting. Be-
cause of the model’s complexity, however, it can only
be solved numerically. The numerical analysis gener-
ates interesting results on policy, welfare, the equilib-
rium distribution of prices, and other issues.
Green and Zhou (1998b) and Zhou (1999) also
present a model with divisible money, where several
results can be derived analytically. Unlike Molico,
they assume that sellers set prices and cannot observe
buyers’ money holdings. Although such an environ-
ment could still have equilibria with a distribution of
prices, they only look for equilibria where all sellers
set the same price. Several interesting results emerge,
including the existence of multiple (indeed, a contin-
uum of) steady states, indexed by the nominal price
level. Also, there can be an endogenous upper bound
for money holdings: Agents with sufﬁcient cash will
not accept more. (Molico’s model can also generate
this.) Related references are Green and Zhou (1998a),
Zhou (1998), Camera and Corbae (1999), Taber and
Wallace (1999), Berentsen (1999a,b), and Rocheteau
(1999). Shi (1997a) presents an analytically solvable
model with perfectly divisible money, but his model is
quite different in some dimensions from the rest of the
literature.17
Thereareotherapplicationsandextensionsthatcan-
not all be considered in this brief review. However,
￿
17 In Shi’s model, the decision-making unit consists of a
family with a large number of members (formally, a contin-
uum), rather than a single individual. In this framework, family
members share money holdings between periods, so every
family starts the next period with the same amount of money
by the law of large numbers. Applications and extensions of
this model are contained in Shi (1998, 1999).
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we want to mention some examples of papers that
study evolution or learning in this framework, includ-
ing Marimon, McGrattan, and Sargent (1990), Sethi
(1996), Staudinger (1998) and Basc ¸i (1999). They
are interested in determining which of the equilibria
are more robust; for example, can agents learn to use
money? Brown (1996), Duffy and Ochs (1998, 1999),
and Duffy (2001) ask the same kind of questions, but
use laboratory methods with paid human subjects to
test them experimentally. Although the results are by
no means deﬁnitive, they are interesting in that they
point to certain areas where laboratory subjects do not
behave as theory predicts. However, the most recent
experiments (Duffy, 2001) produce results that are en-
couraging from the perspective of the theory.
IX. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented simple versions of the
basic search-theoretic models of monetary exchange.
Even these simple models allow a variety of questions
to be addressed, and there are a wide range of exten-
sionsandapplications. Wehopethisillustratestheuse-
fulness of the framework for monetary economics and
will encourage the reader to pursue these issues fur-
ther.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For pure strategy equilibria,
insert p0 and p1 into equations (3) and (4) and deter-
mine the region of parameter space in which the in-
equalities in (5) hold. Consider p0
￿ p1






￿ 1 into (3) and (4), one ﬁnds D0
￿ 0
and D1




￿ , as stated in the
proposition. The other pure strategy cases are sim-
ilar. For mixed strategies, solve Dj
￿ 0 for pj and










￿ 1. For this
to be an equilibrium, we require D0















It is easy to see that p0
￿ 0 iff r
￿ r3 and p0
￿ 1 iff
r
￿ r4, and the condition D1
￿ 0 is redundant. Hence,




￿ , as stated. The
other mixed-strategy cases are similar. In this way, we
obtain the complete set of equilibria.
￿
Proof of Proposition 2: First note that rejecting a
barter offer is always strictly dominated by accepting,
given u
￿ c. Now suppose that the seller gets to pro-
pose and that he proposes a cash transaction. There are
three possibilities. First, if D1
￿ 0 the proposal will be
rejected, so the seller would have been strictly better
off proposing barter. Second, if D1
￿ 0 then the pro-






￿ c), so again the seller would have
been strictly better off proposing barter. So a seller
would never propose a cash trade over barter except
possibly if D1
￿ 0. A symmetric argument implies that
a buyer would never propose a cash trade except pos-
sibly if D0
￿ 0. This gives us two cases to consider: (i)
D0
￿ 0, which implies D1
￿ u
￿ c, which further im-
plies y0
￿ 1 (since D1
￿ 0 implies the seller strictly
prefers barter), which is the only case in which we can
have y1
￿ 1; and (ii) D1




￿ 1, which is the only case in which we can
have y0
￿ 1.










￿ 1. Suppose p1





￿ from proposing a cash transac-
tion, which is strictly less than what he gets proposing
barter. So y0
￿ 1 requires p0p1
￿ 1. Now the value




















































































































This equality is violated for generic parameter values
when y0
￿ 0. Hence there is no equilibrium where
sellers propose cash with probability 1. A symmetric
argument for case (i) implies there is no equilibrium
where buyers propose cash with probability 1. This
means that the unique pure strategy equilibrium is for
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